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Replicator dynamics and evolutionary game of social tolerance: The role of neutral agents

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WOS被引频次:5
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成果类型:
期刊论文
作者:
Shi, Yingying;Pan, Min*;Peng, Daiyan
通讯作者:
Pan, Min
作者机构:
[Shi, Yingying; Pan, Min] Wuhan Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R China.
[Shi, Yingying] Cent China Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Business Adm, Wuhan 430079, Hubei, Peoples R China.
[Peng, Daiyan] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Econ, Wuhan 430074, Peoples R China.
通讯机构:
[Pan, Min] Wuhan Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R China.
语种:
英文
关键词:
C7;D7;Replicator dynamics;Tolerance;Economic interaction model
期刊:
Economics Letters
ISSN:
0165-1765
年:
2017
卷:
159
页码:
10-14
文献类别:
WOS:Article
所属学科:
ESI学科类别:经济&商业;WOS学科类别:Economics
入藏号:
基金类别:
Philosophy and Social Sciences Research, Ministry of Education of China [15JZD013]; National Social Science Fund Project of China [10AZD019]; China Postdoctoral Science Foundation [2015M582250]
机构署名:
本校为其他机构
院系归属:
经济与工商管理学院
摘要:
The role of neutral agents on evolutionary tolerance between two differentiated groups is discussed based on the replicator game model proposed recently. We show that, very different from the pure opposing case studied previously, dynamics of social tolerance with neutral agents is more positive and exhibiting rich interesting effects. The full intolerance steady state (0, 0) is unstable when neutral agents are taken into consideration and there are two type of evolution trajectory according to the population of the neutral agents. Especially, phase trajectories reach to the stable full tolerance steady state (1, 1) at any starting point if the population of the neutral agents is large enough, and the tolerance between different social groups can be a natural consequence of economic integration in the present of neutral agents. We show that neutral agents may remove the contradiction between the traditional idea of economic integration and the evolutionary game point of view. (C) 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V.
参考文献:
Akerlof GA, 2000, Q J ECON, V115, P715, DOI 10.1162/003355300554881
Becchettia L, 2010, J SOCIO-ECON, V39, P81
Berggren N, 2013, KYKLOS, V66, P177, DOI 10.1111/kykl.12017
Berggren N, 2012, PUBLIC CHOICE, V150, P283, DOI 10.1007/s11127-010-9702-x
Bjornskov C., 2004, N8 WP AARH SCH BUS D

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