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Game Analysis of the Evolution of Local Government's River Chief System Implementation Strategy

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成果类型:
期刊论文
作者:
Wang, Juan;Wan, Xin;Tu, Ruide
通讯作者:
Tu, R.
作者机构:
[Wang, Juan] Wuhan Inst Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430205, Peoples R China.
[Wan, Xin] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Inst Income Distribut & Publ Finance, Sch Taxat & Publ Finance, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R China.
[Tu, Ruide] Cent China Normal Univ, Sch Informat Management, Wuhan 430079, Peoples R China.
通讯机构:
School of Information Management, Central China Normal University, Wuhan, China
语种:
英文
关键词:
Evolutionary game;Evolutionary stabilization strategy;Local government;Pareto optimal;River Chief System;Sewage discharge
期刊:
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
ISSN:
1661-7827
年:
2022
卷:
19
期:
4
机构署名:
本校为其他机构
院系归属:
信息管理学院
摘要:
As the executor of the River Chief System (RCS), local governments’ choice of implementation strategies directly affects the quality of regional water environment. The implementation of the RCS involves many interest subjects, and has gradually formed a game between enterprises’ sewage management and local governments’ RCS implementation strategies, and a game between the RCS implementation strategies of different local governments. The game behavior between the interested parties is long-term and dynamic in nature. Strategies such as reduci...

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