期刊论文

Profit-Seeking Petitions in the Territorial Responsibility System: Generation Mechanism and Governance Logic

中文

公共管理学报

1672-6162

2019

16

2

41-56

10.16149/j.cnki.23-1523.20190128.004

教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目（15YJC810024）；

本校为第一机构

谋利型上访作为一种新型的、急剧凸显的农民上访行为,对其生成机制和治理逻辑的分析具有重要的理论和政策意义.本文基于制度分析的视角,通过考察信访制度本身提炼出“属地责任制”的分析性概念,构建信访制度与上访行为的关联性分析框架,基于典型案例的历时性比较分析,研究信访属地责任制如何内部生产出谋利型上访.研究发现,信访属地责任制中上级政府的激励逻辑、村级两委的应付逻辑造成基层政府的避责逻辑,并共同导致了上访谋利空间的生成.基层政府的初始示范、农民上访的自我示范和村庄场域中的社会示范,分别结合上访谋利空间促成谋利型上访的发生、持续和扩散.基层政府的信访治理策略经历了从...

The profit-seeking petition is a new type of peasant petitioning behavior that is sharply highlighted.The objective of this paper is to study the production mechanism and governance logic of profit-seeking petitions,and explain how the petition-responsible land liability system internally produces profit-seeking petitions.Based on the perspective of institutional analysis,this paper refines the analytical concept of'Territorial Responsibility System',constructs the correlation analysis framework of petition system and petition behavior,and cond...