期刊论文

Peng Hao

英文

Economics of Governance

1435-6104

2023

24

2

177-205

10.1007/s10101-023-00291-8

This research was financially supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant No. CCNU22XJ030), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 72204193) and the Foundation Anhui Education Department (Grant No. 2022AH050027). The authors would like to thank the funded project for providing material for this research. We would like to thank our anonymous reviewer for the valuable comments in developing this manuscript.

本校为第一机构

This paper examines the optimal monopoly regulation without transfer based on Basso, Figueroa and Vásquez (Rand J Econ 48(3):557–578, 2017), which compare the quantity-based and price-based instruments to regulate a monopoly that has better information concerning its market demand than the regulator. The optimal screening mechanisms, which offer multiple menus of contracts for the regulated firm to select, and pooling mechanisms, which only provide a uniform contract, are characterized for each instrument. Furthermore, the corresponding perfo...