期刊论文

中文

系统工程学报

1000-5781

2024

39

01

75-90

10.13383/j.cnki.jse.2024.01.006

72001088:国家自然科学基金 20YJC630158:教育部人文社会科学研究项目

本校为第一机构

探究顾客对产品匹配信息不确定下,垄断企业的信息揭露策略与产品线的质量设计.首先分析企业对产品匹配信息的揭露策略如何影响产品线的质量设计,进而探讨企业在哪些情形下会揭露产品的匹配度信息.为探究这些研究问题,构建了一个垄断企业向高估值顾客和低估值顾客销售高端产品和低端产品的模型.研究发现,企业应根据产品匹配度信息的披露策略对应地调整产品线的质量设计.具体而言,相较于不揭露产品信息,如果只揭露高(低)端产品的匹配度信息,低端产品的质量设计应向上提升(向下扭曲),高端与低端产品的质量设计差异减少(增加);如果同时揭露高端和低端产品的匹配度信息,低端产品质量设计的扭曲程度取...

This paper investigates a monopolist's information disclosure strategy and product line design when consumers are uncertain about product matching information.The impact of the firm's matching disclosure strategy on product line design is analyzed,and when the firm should reveal product matching information is discussed.To investigate these questions,a model of a monopolist firm selling high-end and low-end products to heterogeneous consumers is constructed.It is found that the firm should adjust the quality of product line design in accordance with the matching disclosure strategy.Specificall...