期刊论文

Auctions for Online Peer-to-Peer Lending under Stochastic Demand

中文

中国管理科学

1003-207X

2018

26

5

21-30

10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.05.003

国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71372061)/中南大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2017zzts043,2017zzts050)

本校为第一机构

在P2P网络借贷契约中,提供了一种关于随机借款需求的两阶段关闭式降价拍卖,并构成了借款人的一个最优机制。对此,首先设计借贷契约以确定初始借款需求;随后以事前对称贷款人为基准建立相应的拍卖模型,并进行一次标准的关闭式降价拍卖,再从中标贷款人中获得一个额外的借款需求;最后将这个机制拓展到事前非对称贷款人的情形,以分析非对称情形下的拍卖过程,并通过算例加以说明。这个机制对借款人是最优的,而且借款人和贷款人都比较熟悉这种简单拍卖,因此可以用于改进中国P2P网络借贷市场的交易机制。

Auctions are common in everyday life and have penetrated into all areas of online markets,including supply chain procurement,resource allocation,and online e-commerce transactions.In recent years,the auction theory has also been extended to online peer-to-peer(P2P)lending markets for analyzing the interests of lenders and borrower.However,many related researches on online P2Plending markets of China mainly focuse on risk control,behavior decision,trust and supervision.Fewer literatures explore China's online P2Plending trading mechanisms through the auction theory.Therefore,the existing defici...