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Supply Contracts with Credit Sale

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成果类型:
期刊论文、会议论文
作者:
Zheng, Chengli*;Chen, Yan
通讯作者:
Zheng, Chengli
作者机构:
[Zheng, Chengli] Huazhong Normal Univ, Sch Econ, Wuhan, Peoples R China.
[Chen, Yan] Xianning Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Xianning, Peoples R China.
通讯机构:
[Zheng, Chengli] H
Huazhong Normal Univ, Sch Econ, Wuhan, Peoples R China.
语种:
英文
关键词:
supply chian operation;procurement contract;credit sale;budget constraint
期刊:
IEEE/SOLI'2008: PROCEEDINGS OF 2008 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SERVICE OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS, AND INFORMATICS, VOLS 1 AND 2
年:
2008
卷:
2
页码:
2284-2288
会议名称:
2008 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics(IEEE/SOLI’2008)(IEEE服务运作、物流与信息年会)
会议论文集名称:
2008 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics(IEEE/SOLI’2008)(IEEE服务运作、物流与信息年会)论文集
会议时间:
2008-10-12
会议地点:
北京
会议赞助商:
北京交通大学
基金类别:
National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [70701015]
机构署名:
本校为第一且通讯机构
院系归属:
经济与工商管理学院
摘要:
This article proposes a non-cooperation game model to operate the two-agents supply chain with credit sale under stochastic demand function in retailer market and under the retailer's budget constraint. We consider two types of contracts: the traditional wholesale price contract and its variation that is offered by the producer to the retailer. Equilibrium solutions are given for both contracts. And we propose method to operate supply chain profitably through selecting appropriate controllable parameters when the o...

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